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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the impact of graduate education 
on the promotion performance and retention of General 
Unrestricted Line Officers. Logistic models are developed to 
determine the effects of a graduate degree from the Naval 
Postgraduate School and other mources on the probability of 
promotion to Lieutenant Commander and Commander, and on 
retention up tothe Lieutenant Commander and Commander levels. 
Results indicate that graduate education has a positive impact 
on the probability of promotion to Lieutenant Commander, with 
Naval Postgraduate School showing a stronger effect than other 
education sources. No significant effect was noted for 
promotion to Commander. Graduate education was found to have 
a significantly negative impact on retention prior to the 
Lieutenant Commander selection point. Results for retention 
at the Commander selection level were inconclusive. It is 
recommended that further research be done concerning the 
impact of graduate education on other officer communities. 
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a. BACKQROUND 
The benefits of graduate education have been 
acknowledged by the Navy for many years. Graduate education 
encourages "higher levels of professional knowledge and 
technical competence; providcs incentives for recruitment 
and retention of personnel with ability, dedication and 
capacity for growth; and recognizes educational aspirations 
of individuals." [Ref. 11 
In order to encourage its officers to obtain graduate 
education, the Department of Defense (mD) offers several 
educational programs. One such program, the Naval 
Postgraduate School, "exists for the sole purpose of 
increasing combat effectiveness of the Navy and Marine 
Corps. It accomplishes this by providing post-baccalaureate 
degree. . . programs in a variety of subspecialty areas not 
available through other institutions." [Ref. 21 Other DOD- 
sponsored schools include the Air Force Institute of 
Technology and the Defense Intelligence College. 
In those instances where an appropriate curriculum is 
not available at a WD-sponsored school to meet a valid 
subspecialty requirement, the use of a civilian university 
is authorized at Navy expense. [Ref. 1) A list of approved 
civilian institutions appear annually in O~NAVNOTE 1520 
[Ref. 31.  
In addition to Navy-funded programs, an officer may 
choose to pursue a graduate degree at his/her own expense. 
In this case, the officer attends an institution of his/her 
choosing on a not-to-interfere basis with his/her normal 
duties. If he/she should choose to receive acknowledgement 
of the degree for a Navy subspecialty code, he/she must 
request approval in ?=cordance with the Manual of Navy 
officer Manpower and Personnel classification [R6?. 41.  
The attainment of a graduate degree in the Navy is 
useful in partially fulfilling the requirements as a proven 
subspecialist in a particular field. Although one can also 
become a proven subspecialist through repeated tours of duty 
in a specific area of expertise, the most common path to 
this goal is through graduate education. Since designation 
as a proven subspecial!st is a criteria for promotion to 
higher payqrades ( a .  Commander and Captain), the 
attainment of a graduate degree is critical to success in 
the Navy. 
B. OBJtCTIvB 
Tho objective of this thesis is to compare the effects 
of graduate education on General Unrestricted Line Officers' 
(Gen URL) probability of promotion and of leaving the Navy. 
Specifically, individuals with degrees from the Naval 
effects of graduate education are evaluated using 
multivariate analytical techniques. 
other sources, (including both Navy- and self-funded 
programs), and to those without a graduate degree. The : 
C. 8COPE, LIMITATIONS, MSU?IPTIONS 
The General Unrestricted Line Officer community is 
chosen for this study because the career path for Gen URLs, 
unlike the Surface Warfare community, is not based around 
specific technical/warfare qualifications. Rather, wstrong 
performance in both leadership and subspecialty b~llets is 
the traditional path to career success . . .". [Ref. 51 
Consequently, attainment of a graduate degree can provide 
the Gen URL officar with an advantage in achieving career 
path requirements. Other communities also have a 
requirement to attain proven subspecialist designations; 
however, subspecialty attainment is not as critical to 
promotion as it is in the Gen URL community. 
A potential limitation of this study is that the 
majority of officers in the senior paygrades of the Gen URL 
community are women who fit a relatively standard profile. 
(i.e., most are white and single, with no dependents). The 
distribution of Gen URLs by demogr~ghic categories is 
provided in Tables 7 - 10 of Chapter 111. Histcrically, the 
males in the community automatically transferred in to the 
community for a variety of reasons, including family 
hardships, medical and academic disqualifications from other 
communities and failure to obtain required warfare 
qualifications. (This practice was changed as a result of 
the 1987 Women's Study Group and since 1990 the Gen WRL 
community selectively accepts transfers into the community 
on a case-by-case basis). [Ref. 61 As a result, most males 
have not been strong competitors for promotion to the higher 
paygrades and, therefore, are not well represented in the 
dataset for the promotion model for Commanders. This, in 
turn, results in a lack of variation in the characteristics 
of the senior Gen URL officers included in the sample and 
may inhibit a thorough analysib of their probability of 
promotion or of leaving the Navy. 
D. OBGAHIXATIOH OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I1 contains a review of human capital investment 
theory and how it relates to graduate education. It also 
includes a review of pertinent literature on graduate 
education and retention. Chapter IS1 describes the 
formulation and content of the data sets studies and an 
explanation of the research methodology utilized. Chapter 
IV presents the results from the multivariate analysis. 
Chapter V includes conclusions derived from the multivariate 
analysis and recommendations for further research. 
1 REVIEW OI LITERATURE 
A CAPITAL INVESTXEHT TEE9RY 
When discussing an officer's decision to obtain graduate 
education, one can do so in terms of Becker's theory of 
human capital investment. [Ref. 7 )  The thaory of human 
capital is based on the assumption that education, training, 
and some on-the-job work experiences are investments that 
have an immediate cost and that yield a future stream of 
returns. Costs are normally incurred in the form of direct 
expenses (e-g., tuition, books, utc.) and the opportunity 
cost to the individual (i.e., foregone earnings). From the 
employer's perspective, if the initial costs can be 
recovered with an acceptable rate of return over the 
worker's remaining (expected) employment in the form of 
increased productivity, then the investment will be 
undertaken. Prom the employee's viewpoint, as long as his 
portion of the investment expense is recovered with an 
acceptable increase in earnings/benefits, then he will 
choose to undertake the investment. 
Although all aspects of human capital investment theory 
can be related to the military, for purposes of this study, 
only one specific type of human capital investment will be 
discussed, that of graduate education for naval officers. 
The decision to invest in graduate education can be 
discussed in terms of three characteristics: (1) the 
specificity of the investment to the Navy; (2) the means of 
financing; and (3) the timing of the investment. 
First, human capital investments can be either general 
or firm-specific in nature. General investments in graduate 
education are thosh that increase the productivity of the 
individual with employer, including the Navy. In the 
case of naval officers, a graduate degree in Business 
Administration or Psychology, for example, could be 
considered a general investment because it could enhance an 
individual's productivity in other organizations. Pirm- 
specific human capital investments, on the other hand, 
increase the individual's productivity only in a specific 
organization/firm. An example of firm-specific graduate 
education could be a Master's Degree in Anti-Submarine 
Warfare Although a few of the courses in this graduate 
pragram could be considered general human capital 
investment, the prc5:am mostly enhances the officer's 
benefit to the Navy. 
A second characteristic of human capital investment is 
the means of financing the investment. When obtaining 
graduate education in the Navy, one has several options. 
One can undertake fully-funded graduate education, full-time 
funded graduate education or self-funded graduate education. 
Those considered fully-funded attend graduate school full- 
tine at the Naval Postgraduate School or other approved 
Department of Defense or civilian institution. All 
educational expenses are paid by the Department of the Navy 
and the individual continues to receive full pay and 
allowances. In return for this investment, the individual 
mowesn the Navy an active duty obligation period "equal to 
three times the number of months of such education completed 
during the first year of graduate school. . ." [Ref. 81. 
Education exceeding 12 months is repaid on a month-for-month 
basis. [Ref. 11 In addition, "officers who have received 
Navy funded graduate education will serve one tour in a 
validated subspecialty position as soon as possible, but not 
later than the second tour followinc graduation." [Ref. 11 
Thus, while the Navy pays the direct costs of the education, 
as well as the opportunity costs, the individual also incurs 
a mcostn in the form of additional obligated service. 
Individuals in full-time funded -:rograms attend school 
full-time and receive full pay and benefits, but tuition is 
paid by the individual or by a non-Navy funued scholarship. 
[Ref 11. Any individual attending a graduace education 
program for 26 weeks or more is considered to be in a full- 
time Navy funded program and is subject to the same active 
service obligation indicated above. 
An individual may, of course, choose to obtain a 
graduate degree at his own expense. This must be done on a 
not-to-interfere basis with one's regular duties. Once a 
degree is obtained, the officer is under no additional 
service obligation to the Navy, since the Navy did not 
contribute to the investment expense. 
Regardless of the type of educational investment (i.e., 
general or firm-specific), if the individual receives Navy 
funding for graduate education, he is required to complete 
additional service. In this way, the Navy gets a return on 
its investment in the officer who is presumed to be more 
productive during the obligated period. 
Finally, the third characteristic of human capital 
investment is the timing of the investment. From the 
officer's viewpoint, greater returns from an investment in 
graduate education are realized the sooner the investment is 
undertaken. Consequently, an officer's record is consiCered 
by the Graduate Education Selection Board at any time 
between the third and tenth year of commissioned service. 
The earlier the investment is made, the longer the period of 
time over which prior investment costs can be recouped. 
From the Navy's perspective, the timing is not as critical 
because an additional service obligation is incurred 
regardless of when the degree is received. However, it is 
important that the Navy provide its officers with graduate 
education prior to the time when that knowledge would be 
needed for a particular billet/job. 
8 .  QBADmTE EDUCATION RESEARCH 
Although the benefits of graduate education to the Navy 
have been acknowledged and documented, [Xef. 11, research on 
this area has been limited. Significant work on graduate 
education was done by Lockman, Cymrot, Richardson and Murray 
(1986) [Ref. 91. Although not a quantitative analysis, 
their study does provide useful statistics to document the 
Navy's emphasis on graduate education and to help quantify 
its value to the individual and the organization. 
Lockman ef. a looked at the graduate education levels 
and specialty fields of Naval officers in key leadership and 
management billets. These figu:es were compared to those of 
managers of civilian firms, U.S. Navy civil servants, 
foreign military services and other U.S. military services. 
In addition, they discussed subspecialty coding of at-sea 
billets and Systems Acquisition Management Education, which 
are unrelated to this thesis. 
Overall, the level of graduate education in the Navy 
compared well to that of corporate managers and to high 
level Navy civil servants. At the graduate level, the 
officers and the corporate managers are on a par at about 20 
percent, and the URL and civil eervice levels are 16 
percent. Specific figures are proviced in Table 1. However, 
the Navy utilized graduate education more extensively than 
the civilian community. Further, the Navy invests more in 
training and educating its officers than do civilian firms 
or civil service. On the other hand, graduate education in 
the civilian sector and the federal civil s e ~ i c e  tended to 
be used for specific jobs, whereas in the Navy, it was 
utilized in a variety of assignments and responsibilities. 
They also compared graduate education between the U.S. 
and foreign militaries. The Soviet and West German 
militaries wars Sound to have higher rates of officer 
graduate education than the U.S. Navy. But their purposes 
and the utilization of graduates mignificantly differed from 
ours. The Soviet program had a high political content, 
while the West German program was viewed as beneficial to 
society at large since many of their officers return to the 
civilian community. 
<Baahelor's Baahelorm Xamter's + Doatorate r Postgraduate 
I 
Adjusted officer corp 4 75 2 1 * 1 2 1 
URL 1 8 3 16 <1 16 
Navy civil S e N k e  37 4 2 14 2 16 
Civilian firm average 34 45 17 3 2 0 
Compared to other services, all of which have fully 
funded, full-time graduate education programs, the 6,-w had 
the highest percent load ratio of officers with graduate 
education to officer end strength of any service, with a I 
. 
ratio of 1.75 graduate educated officers per 1,000 end I 
. strength. (Load ratios are computed by dividing the number I 
of officers in graduate education programs annually by the I 
number of active duty officers). Comparative figures are I 
provided in Table 2. 
1 
Uilftary Uanpover Training Report 
I FYDP 
I 
In discussing the Navy's return on its investment in 
officer graduate education, the authors echoed some problems 
that appeared in other studies, specifically, selectivity 
bias and calculating the true return on one's investment. 
First, since selection for graduate education is 
cospetitive, the m?re capable officers tend to be selected. 
. 
[Ref. 101 Therefore, comparing productivities of officers 
. with and without graduate education would tend to overstate 
the benefits. Those with graduate education are likely to 
be evaluated as more capable even without the advanced 
degree. 
Second, the affect of graduate education on retention is 
uncertain. Part of the benefit of graduate education is 
Navy- specific and encourages officers to stay in the Navy. 
However, graduate education also improves general skills 
(e.g., in leadership and management) and makes officers more 
marketable to civilian employers. 
Third, graduate education can significantly enhance an 
officer'm problem solving abilities, thereby increasing his 
productivity. But because this effect is difficult to 
measure it is often'overlooked or underestimated when 
calculating a return on an investment in education. 
Lockman pf clearly indicate that measuring the 
productivity of leaders and managers is not an easy task. 
However, measurable differences can be observed in 
promotion, retention, and subordinate performance. 
They also briefly discussed graduate education and 
performance. They attempted to measure performance through 
fitness reports, but found insufficient variation in 
markings to provide substantial results. They also analyzed 
promotion and retention patterns for officers on the Officer 
Master Pile as of March 1985 with eight to 30 years' length 
of service. No direct causal relationship could be 
established. However officers with graduate education 
tended to be promoted faster and stayed in the Navy longer 
than those who did not. Finally, they also compared the 
readiness measures on Material Condition Index (MCI) scores 
for ship CO's and XO's with acd without graduate education. 
They found that ships whose CO/XO had graduate education had 
Planned Maintenance System (PUS) scores five points higher 
than those without graduate education. PMS scores, in turn, 
were a significant contributor to MCI scores. The magnitude 
of the relationship was as high as that found between 
measures of personnel resources and material condition in a 
related Center for irmal Analysis study done in 1986. [Ref. 
111 
The study by LarA'man +f a provides a general framework 
of information about qraduate education in the Navy. The 
most specific and detailed analysis of the benefits of 
qraduate education was done 8y m o t  in 1986. [Ref lo] 
The basis of human capital investment theory states that 
additional education makes officers more productive. Three 
common indicators of productivity are: performance within 
rank, retention, and promotion. Cymrot specifically 
addressed the issue of the effect of graduate education on 
promotion. Pe developed a technique for determining at 
least a portion of the marginal benefit to the Navy from 
additional graduate education. (Increased promotion rates 
being only one component of the marginal benefit). 
Cymrot looked at aata on Naval officers on active duty 
in March 1985 who had length of service ( W S )  between eight 
and 30 years, the timefraae when most officers have 
completed graduate education through their retirement. He 
did not, however, include a variable indicating specifically 
when a graduate degree w?,s obtained. Further, he focused on 
Unrestricted Line (URL), 2estricted Line (RL), and Staff 
Corps officers. Limited Duty Officers were eliminated 
because of the small number of observations available. 
The data that Cymrot utilized did not include officers 
who had left active duty prior to 1985. Consequently, he 
acknowledges that there could be differences in 
characteristics between those who stayed in the Navy and 
those who left, which could bias the results. 
In determining the partial effect of graduate education 
on the probability of promotion (the dependent variable), he 
developed a logit model using the following categories of 
independent variables: personal characteristics, previous 
experience and performance indicators, and Navy structural 
variables. The personal characteristics included age, sex 
(MUE =I), race (WHITE-I), and a dummy variable indicating 
if an officer had a graduate deqzee (GRAD ED = 1). The GRAD 
ED variable was most important in Cymrot's study, but the 
other variables were necessary to control for other factors 
that also could influence promotion. 
graduate educated officers. To deal with this potential 
selectivity bias, Cymrot included variables reflecting 
previous experience and performance, based on time in rank 
and service continuity. The time-in-rank variable (TINRANK) 
measured the number of months spent in ranks below the 
current rank being studied, and captured the rate of an 
officer's previous promotion. Cymrot included the previous 
promotion rate variable to reflect soma inherent differences 
in productivity among officers that is unrelated to the 
effects of graduate educazion. 
The service continuity variable (DROPOVT=l) was used to 
identify those with discontinuous Naval service. It was 
anticipated that those who left the Navy and later returned 
would have a different level of productivity than an officer 
with corltinuous service. Initially, one would expect the 
effect to be negative because leaving the Navy may lead to a 
depreciation of talents. IIowever, it may be that officers 
who leave the Navy have unique characteristics that make 
them more productive both in and out of the Navy. 
The designator dummy variables were included as 
structural variables and were coded as URL (base case), RL, 
and STAFF. These were included to see the differances in the 
Since officers selected for graduate education may have 
been selected becauss of their superior promotability, one 
cannot state unequivocally that graduate education "caused" 
some individuals to promote at higher rates than non- 
probability of promotion between designators. The 
observations were grouped by four promotion points and 
respective LOS groupings: LT to LEOR (LOS 8 - 14), LCDR to 
CDR (LOS 14 - 21), CDR to CAPT (LOS 20 - 1 6 ) ,  CAPT to FLAG 
(LOS 25 - 30). Each LOS group was analyzed separately. 
Cymrot's results are depicted in Table 3. Additional logit 
regressions were run to determine the effect of graduate 
education on promotion probabilities at each LOS year. 
These probabilities appear in Table 4. 
TABLE 3.  D E T ~ I ~ S  OF PROXOTIOX BY GROUPS OF LOB 
TUBLZ 4 
CHANGE IN PIIOUOTION PROBABILITIES 
=OW GRADUATE EDUCATION BY LOB AND RAM% 
Cymrot found the GRAD ED variable to be positive and 
significant for all selection points (LT to LCDR, LCDR to 
CDR, etc.) except from CAPT to flag rank. His results 
I 
indicated that graduate education increased the probability 
Of promotion to LCDR by 262, to CDR by 10.62, to CAPT by 
16.52 and the Flag by 02. Two alternative explanations were 
offered for these results. First, graduate education could 
have increased an officer's productivity, thereby increasing 
his chances of getting pramoted. This is especially 
important. since control variables were included to account 
for his previous experiences. Alternatively, the graduate 
education selection committee did a good job in selecting 
"promotable" officers to attend graduate school. Cymrot 
felt the first explanation was more cr~dible because of his 
controlling for previous time-in-rank. The TINRANK 
variables had consistently negative and significant 
coefficients, indicating that the less time spent in 
pre~ious paygrades (the faster promotions came), the more 
likely an officer is to get promoted to the next rank. 
Of the personal characteristics variables, only AGE had 
a significant impact on promotion -- older officers were 
more likely to get promoted to a higher grade than younger 
ones. Neither sex nor race had a consistent impact, though 
males wera more likely to get promoted to LCDR than females. 
By designator, URL officers were found to be nore likely 
to be promoted to LCDR than RL or STAFF. But above that 
level, there was no significant difference between URL and 
RL. However, both categories were more likely than STAFF to 
be promoted to higher ranks. U S  was positive and 
significant for all levels, but this was anticipated because 
one of the criteria for promotion is length of service. 
The DROPOUT variable had a surprising result. It was 
positive and significant for all ranks but the Flag levels. 
In the civilian labor market one would tend to be1ie.e that 
an inconsistent work racord would decrease one's chances of 
promotion. However, results of this study showed broken 
service did not prove detrimental to one's probability of 
promotion in the Navy. Cymrot felt that this could be 
because the sample of people who leave and return is not 
random, but rather that they may all exhibit above average 
ability. However, since officers wt.0 lef+ the Navy before 
1985 are not included in this study, one cannot definitively 
conclude that the effects shown by the DROPOUT variable are 
indeed reflective of actual activity. 
Cymrot also considered the effect of graduate education 
on below-zonn promotions. His results showed that graduate 
education helped in getting early promotion as well as 
ensured eventual promotion in-zone. 
To determine the Navy's return on its investment in 
graduate education, Cymrot compared the marginal benefit to 
the marginal cost. Utilizing the equation: 
E(MB)t = MP1 (P: - P:) (a, - a d  
where KP' = the marginal product at M S  1 
(in this case equivalent to the MP for LT 
at MS 8) 
p: = the probability of promotion for 
graduate educated officers 
p; = the probability of promotion for non- 
graduate educated officers 
a, a productivity index at each rank = WP,/KP1 
and information from Tables (4) and ( 5 ) ,  he estimated -8 
benefit to be betworn 15 and 40 percent of the productivity 
of a Lieutenant at LOS 8. (Table 5 shows the value of the 
a,'s for the ranks and Loss relevant in th?s study using the 







by dividing the base pay for each rank and LOS by the base 
pay for lieutenants with U)S 8.) The majority of the 
marginal cost of graduate education is the time the officer 
spends in school. For most programs, officers spend 
approximately 18 to 24 months in school at LOS 6 or 7. 
Assuming an officer's time at LOS 6 or 7 is approximately 
equal to that at LOS 8, the marginal cost of graduate 
education would be 18 to 24 months, while the marginal 
benefit resulting from increased promotion was determined to 
be only 2 to 5 months. However, as Cymrot also pointed out, 
one would need to determine the other components of the 
benefits (e.g., increased productivity within rank and 
increased retention) in order to estimate the full benefit 
of graduate education to the Navy. Only then can an 
accurate comparison of marginal costs to benefits be made. 
TABLE 5 
BABE PAY AT DIFFERENT -8 AUD LO8 
RELATIVE TO BABE PAY OP LIEIITRIANTS AT LO8 6 
Utilizing human capital investment theory, Stainer 
(1987) [Ref. li] also tried to measure the benefits to the 
Navy and the individual officer of investing in graduate 
education. As a nproxyn for an officer's marginal 
productivity, he calculated survivor rates and time in rank 
(TIR) between promotions for three groups: Navy funded 
Master's degree, self-funded Master's degree, and non- 
Master's. His results showed that Navy-funded degree 
graduates stayed in the Navy longar and were promoted faster 
than either of the two remaining groups. 
Utilizing data from the Officer Master Pile and Naval 
Postgraduate School student records, he looked at 
Uarestricted Line (URL) officers in LOS 3-35. (The LOS range 
reflected when the majority of URL officers received their 
graduate education). Data elements/independent variables 
utilized were: designator, gain/loss indicator, Separation 
Program Designator (Loss Code), Promotion History/Date of 
Rank, and hducational Information (Year, Sponsor, Major) . 
1 
He calculated survivor rates for each cohort using the 
following formula: 
E[GJ = E{X,/n] = l/n E[XJ = n*gi/n = gi 
where G, = ourvivor rate at i - ( X ,  /n) 
n = original number in a cohort 
X, = the number that are still in the system in 
future period i 
gi = the probability that an individual survives i 
years 
His results from calculating survivor rates indicated 
that almost a11 Navy-funded graduate degree recipients 
remain in the service "within the prescribed minimum 
obligation of service dictated by DOD policya, i.e., they 
fulfilled their additional service obligation. Further 
analysis also revealed that 882 separated from the service 
due to either expiration of their term of service or 
mandatory retirement. Of those who retired, less than 102 
failed to select for promotion to higher ranks for LOS 15 
and below. A majority of non-Navy funded graduates 
separated within the first two years after graduation. A 
significant number of officers witnout Master's Degrees 
separated during the first year after completion of their 
commissioning source minimum service obligation. 
In testing for statistical differences in TIR, he 
utilized sample means and sample atandard deviations from 
each promotion category (i.e., 0-3 to 0-4, 0-4 to 05, 05 to 
06) and compared the differences for those with fully funded 
versus self-funded graduate education. 
His hypothesis was: 
H, : q1 - u, = 0 (null hypothesis) 
HI :u, -u, b 0  (alternative hypothesis) 
with the test statistic: 
and rejection region = Reject H, if l z l  > zd 
Results of the TIR tests showed that, for promotion from 
0-3 to 0-4, Navy-funded graduate officers are promoted on 
the average, nearly two months sooner than the other 
comparison groups. Also, w e n  determining the number of 
officers being promoted, both the Navy-funded and self- 
funded graduate officer totals outnumbered the non-Master's 
officers by a ratio of two to one. (This was due to the 
large number of non-Master's officers who leave the service 
prior to eligibility for 0-4). Results for promotion from 
0-5 to 0-6 indicated that a Navy-funded gradua~e officer was 
promoted on average nearly six months sooner than a non- 
Master's officer and three months sooner than a self-funded 
graduate officer. 
In determining who benefits from an investment in 
graduate education, Stainer stated that both the Navy and 
the individual benefit. The Navy benefits significantly 
because officers who receive fully funded graduate education 
are estimated to remain in the Navy longer than either of 
the other two categories. The URL officer benefits because 
of the faster promotion times for officers with a graduate 
degree. 
C. IlfiEE3TIOLS RFSBARCH 
The subject of retention and attrition in the military 
has been studied extensively throughout the years. Many 
studies focus on the reasons why people choose to leave the 
Navy. Others focus on the behavior of those leaving the 
Navy and attempt to deternine a similar pattern of 
characteristics. Most retention studies focus on the 
enlisted force. Because this study is focused upon the 
retention behavior of officers, only retention studies on 
officers will be cited. 
Research by Lowell (1987) [Ref. 131 focused on career 
orientation of >fficers, specifically the issue of female 
naval officers. He looked at the effects of biodemographic, 
personal, tenure, economic, civilian alternatives and job 
related factors on female officers' turnovu decisions. 
Utilizing the 3985 DOD Survev of 0- 
Parso;mel, he conducted a binary logit analysis to determine 
the effects of the above listed variable categories on short 
and long term career intentions. Officers were divided into 
two groups: Group I - those with five or less YOS; Group 11 
- those with greater than five but less than 10 YOS. 
The final logit models tested 20 independent variables. 
Results, by group, indicated: 
Group I - Older women were more likely to be career 
oriented than younger women. The effects of race, 
education, family status and most job related factors were 
insignificant. Job Satisfaction, however, was negative and 
significant at the .O1 level. Of the designator variables, 
those in occupations other than GEN URL, Aviation, and 
Supply appeared to be career oriented. 
The personal influence variable TASTE was significant, 
indicating that individuals with strong taste for the 
military will make it a career; more tr less a self- 
selection process. 
Additional results indicated that USNA graduates were 
strongly career oriented; those with more time in the Navy 
tended to stay for 20 years; and those who felt they had 
good civilian job opportunities were less likely to stay for 
a career. 
Group TI - The variables for job factars showed that 
Promotion Opportunities and Family Satisfaction had the most 
significant effect on career orientation. As with Group I, 
both TASTE and T- were also significant. 
When comparing the two groups, both AGE and EDUC changed 
from positive in Group I to negative in Croup 11. While not 
significant, the pattern indicated to Lowell that the older 
and more experienced (educated) a woman became, the less 
likely she was to stay in the Navy. 
Though statistically insignificant, the Family Status 
variables indicated that a female officer married to a 
service member with children was more likely to leave the 
Navy, the longer she remained in the Navy. However, the 
military couple without children appeared, in the long term, 
to indicate that the female officer would stay for a career. 
Among job factor variables, the shict in significance 
from Job Satisfaction in Group I to Promotion Opportunities 
in Group I1 suggested that promotion opportunities had a 
more significant effect on career orientation over time. 
Lovellls overall results suggested that women in the 
Navy have few real career opportunities and tend to leave 
the service due to lack of billets and promotion 
opportunities. Since the time of his research, efforts have 
been made to expand the billets and promotion opportunities 
for women in all designators. Additional research would be 
necessary to determine if attitudes and retention behavior 
have changed as a result of these efforts. 
D. RELATED R B B m R c a  
Related research has been done on the effect of 
commissioning sources on performance, promotion, and 
retention in the Navy. In 1990 the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) did a study to determine if cost differentials 
from different commissioning sources were related to 
differences in performance of ofricers. [Ref. 141 They 
measured performance in three ways: (1) length of time on 
active duty after commissioning; (2 )  time to promotion; and 
(3) rate of involuntary separation from active service. CEO 
determined that, in costs to DOD, the service academies were 
the most expensive, with the Naval Academy costing $153,000 
per graduate. This cost is three to four times higher than 
that of NXOTC and eight to 15 times higher than OCS. 
In terms oi performance, the study found that, in 
general, academy graduates remain in the service longer than 
officers from other commissioning programs. USNA graduates, 
on average, served two months longer than NROTC scholarship 
graduates and 16 months longer than NROTC rontract 
graduates. In terms of promotions, there was virtually no 
difference among the various commissioning sources for 
promotions to 0-3. Wowever, prcmotion time to 0-4 did 
reveal some differences. OCS graduates were promoted 
approximately three months *sloverm than officers from 
either of the other sources. And at the senior ranks, 
results showed that nearly one half of all Navy Admirals 
were commissioned through the Naval Academy. This study did 
not delineate whether non-selects were included in this 
model, however. 
Rates of involuntary separation were found to be low 
across the board (< l.OZ), however, they were somewhat lower 
for NROTC graduates than for USNA or OCS graduates. Arain, 
we don't know if non-selects were included in this model. 
They may have chosen to leave voluntarily before being 
*forcad* out. If so, these results could underestimate the 
true results. 
Although CBO provided no aperific recommendations in 
this study, they emphasized the need for policy makers to 
review marginal costs and returns on investment to determine 
what proportion of new officers should come from the various 
training programs in the future. 
Poster (1990) [Ref. 151 also studied differences in 
parformance and retention by commissioning source. He 
analyze* the relative productivity of Naval officers from 
the various commissioning sources based on fitness reports. 
His data set included officers of all communities 
commissioned between 1977 and 1987 with current paygrades 
ranging from 0-1 to 0-4. (Females were eliminated due to 
small sample sizes). 
In determining wproductivityn, he developed two 
performance indices. One, based on work by Bowman (1990), 
defined an individual as a superior performer (the dependent 
variable) if he received the highest evaluation on the three 
slements of the fitness report: recommendation for 
promotion, command desirability, and overall mission 
contribution/evaluation. A binary variable was coded nonew 
for superior performers anG wzeron otherwise. The second 
index was based on work by Neumann (1989) and was 
Conclt~cted by calculating the percentage of times when the 
officer was recommended for early promotion during the 
entire period he was observed. 
Using multivariate (logit) analysis with the Bowman 
index and OLS regression analysis with the Naumann in$ex, 
Foster found that Naval Academy graduates tended to have a 
higher probability of being rated superior performers 
compared to officers from other commissioning sources. The 
largest difference in performance, using Bowman's dependent 
variable, was found in the submarine community where NROTC 
graduates were five percentage points less likely to be 
rated superior than USNA graduates. Reviewing the 
proportion of early promotion recommendations also found 
USNA graduates ahead of others but only by a small margin. 
NBOTC and OCS graZuates averages four and six percentage 
points, respectively, behind USNA graduates. 
Although the differences were small, Foster's results 
showed that USNA graduates did outperform officers from 
other commissioning sources. 
The relevance of these studies to this current thesis is 
in the importance of controlling for commissioning source 
when constructing a model on the effect of graduate 
education on promotion and retention. Since studies have 
shown significant differences in performance by 
commissioning source, these differences must be controlled 
prior to making any conclusions about the effects of 
graduate education. 
111. DATA AND ~ O W L O C I Y  
A TZE DATA 
L'he data sets used in this study are developed from U.e 
Officer Promotion History Data Files and the Officer Master 
Record Files (OMRF) and maintained at the Defense Manpower 
Data Center in Monterey, CA. The Officer Promotion History 
File contains demographic, educational, experience, and 
selection board data on all officers, both active and 
reserve, in paygrades 0-2 (LTJG) through 0-7 (RADM) and are 
archived beginning in Fiscal Year 1981. The files utilized 
are developed to take advantage of a specific nubset of 
background information created by Dr. William Bowman, U.S. 
Naval Academy, (Navy Officer Background Data Fde) and were 
current through Fiscal Year 1990. Loss data are utilized 
from the Officer Waster Loss File ( O F ) ,  a separate file 
maintained at DMDC. These data are derived from officers 
commissioned between 1970 and 1982 and who h&ve :eft the 
Navy at any time following commission (through 31 Cecembar 
1990). Only seven data elanants are extracte4 ?or this 
study. These are included in Table 6. 
TABLE C 
LOB8 PILE DATA ELB(EHTB 
Social Security IIumber (scrambledj 
Grade at Separation 
Community Designator 
Ssparation Program Designator 
Inter-Service Separation Code 
Date of Separation 
Active-Reserve Status at Separation 
Because the focus of this study is on General 
Unrestricted Line Officers, those officers with the 
designator 1100 or 1105 created the initial set of files 
from which all others are created. Additionally, the 
officers are categorized into three groups of General URL 
officers: those appearing before the Lieutenant, Lieutenant 
Comander, and Commander selection boards. This was done to 
dete,sine if any significant differences occur between the 
effects of graduate education on selection boards at 
different paygrades. 
Two files for each category are compiled for this study 
to datenuins the probabilizy of leaving the Navy and the 
probability of being promoted. The first file, called 
"LEAVEHS", consists of General URL officers who either leave 
the General URL community prior to the LCDR selection boards 
(available only in LCDR file) or leave the Navy -. 
The seco~ld file, called nSTAYERSm, consists of officars 
who remain in the Navy as General URL officers, those whs 
transferd into the General URL community, as well as those 
who leave the Navy prior to the LCDR/CDR 
selection board. (Specific steps taken to construct these 
files are detailed in Appendix A). 
The purpose of separating involuntary leavers from 
voluntary leavers is to model voluntary separation/promotion 
behavior in the General URL community more accurately. 
Those who leave the Navy, or the community, involuntarily 
are known to leave because of poor performance. Individuals 
who leave due to poor health, retirement, or who die are 
excluded completely from the study (52 obs). In this 
manner, STAYERS include those who are promoted and retained 
in the Navy as well as those who stay to a promotion board 
and are passed over along with those whose poor performance 
caused earlier separation. In this way, those officers who 
leave the Navy voluntarily are separated from all others in 
this study. 
The numbers of observations in the STAYERS and LEA- 
files are provided i~ Table 7. 
TABLE 7 
m E R S  OF OBSERVATIONS IN SAUPLES 
"STAYERS8* "L?.AVZRS" 
tCDR P001.d Woman-Only Pooled woman-only 
8. DIETEOWLOOY 
1. Tho lo4018 
Logistic regression models are used in this study to 
explain the probability of voluntarily leaving the Navy 
separate from the joint probability of voluntarily staying 
and being promoted. This technique is comonly used when 
the dependent variable is binary, (1 = leave; 0 - stay or 1 
= pomote; 0 = passed over). The logit model is associated 
with the cumulative logistic probability function where, if 
Pi is the probability of leaving/promoting and X, . . ., X, 
is a set of explanatory variables. The form of the general 
equation is: 
In this notation, e represents the base of natural 
logarithms, Pi is the probability that an individual will 
make a certain choice given X,. Logit analysis will provide 
the estimates of the parameters a and 0 .  (Ref.161 
2. V8riables 
a -pendent Variables 
The dependent variable used for the retention 
model is constructed using the Separation Program Designator 
codes from the Officer Master Record Files (Loss variables). 
Specifically, the codes indicating a voluntary separation or 
release from the Navy are categorized as LEAVE - 1, 
otherwise LEAVE = 0. These codes and the numbers of 
observations associated with each are included in Table 8. 
TABLE 8 
BEPARATION PROaRAn DESIGNATOR CODES 
TYPE OF SEPARATION CODES lsrmBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
Voluntary PBX 490 (47.32) 
Resignations FDF 12 (1.12) 




MBK 282 (27.2%) 
WF e (00.7%) 
MFF 2 (00.2%) 
HGP 6 (00.5%) I 
These codes can be found in NMPCINST 1910.1B [Ref 171 
The dependent variable used for the promotion 
model is constructed from the mperformancem variable from 
the Officer Promotion History Pile--Navy Officer Background 
Data. In this file, PERFORMANCE = 1 if the officer was an 
early select 
PERFORMANCE = 2 if the officsr was an in zone select 
PERFORMANCE = 3 if the officer was an in zone pass 
PERFORMANCE = 4 if the officer was a late select 
PERFORMANCE = 5 if the officer was a late pass 
The dependent variable PROMOTE = 1 if the 
performance variable equalled 1 or 2, otherwise PROMOTE = 0. 
The "late selectn performance code, PERFORMANCE = 4, and 
"late passn performance code, PERFORMANCE = 5, were omitted 
because the majority of those passed over initially leave 
voluntarily or are involuntarily forced out after failing to 
select above zone. 
b. Independent Verf ables 
The independent variables included in this study 
could be grouped into two q?neral categories: variables 
representing demographic and personal attributes of the I 
officers, and variables representing educational background. 
The independent variables used in each model are identically 
constructed, although not all variables are included in both 
models. The distribution of observations by independent 
variables is included in Tables 9 - 12. 
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TABLE 10 
DISTRIBUTION OP LCDR "LEAVERB" BY IIYDEPEHDENT VARIABLES 





































DISTRIBUTIOU O I  CDR "STAYER8" BY IHDEPEHDEHT W I A B L E B  
USNA 
m c s  
0 8 0 m ( C E  
O C s m c  
WOKIDS 
IURDEP8 




P C S M  
OTHeRltD 
R M  
NONTEM 
G R M  





n - 404 
TABLE 12 




































The demographic/background variables are 
described below: 
m: Three variables are constructed for this 
category: WHITE = 1 if race = white, otherwise WHITE = o 
(base case); BLACK = 1 if race = black, otherwise BLACK = 
OTHER = 1 if race = other, otherwise OTHER = 0. 
Age: This is a continuous variable indicating the 
individual's age at time of commissioning. Age ranged from 
20 to 35. 
m: MALE = 1 if gender = male, otherwise MALE = 0 
Commissionina Source: Pour variables define this 
category: 
OCSROTC = 1 if Commissioning Source = Officer Candidate 
School or Naval Reserve Officer Training Course - College 
Program, otherwise OCSROTC = 0 (base case); USNA = 1 if 
Commissioning Source = U. S. Naval Academy, otherwise USNA = 
0; R W C S  = 1 if Commissioning Source = Naval Reserve 
Officer Training Program - Scholarship, otherwise ROTCS = 0; 
and OSOURCE = 1 if Commissioning Source = Direct Appointment 
or NESEP, otherwise OSOURCE = 0. 
m-: Three variables are used in 
rhis category: 
NOKIDS = 1 if member is single or married with no 
dependents, otherwise NOKIDS = 0 (base case); MARLIEPS = 1 if 
member is married with one or more children, otherwise 
MARDEPS = 0; DIVONE = 1 if member is divorced or separated 
with one or more children, otherwise DIVONE * 0 .  
The educational background variables are defined 
as follows: 
aduate Dearee Maioy: Two variables are 
used in this category: 
TECH = 1 if the individual's undergraduate major is 
engineering, math, computer science, operations analysis, or 
natural/biological science, otherwise TECH = 0. 
NONTECH = 1 if the individual's undergraduate major is 
social sciences, arts, humanities, management, economics, 
education, etc., otherwise NONTECH = 0. 
Weraraduate Grade Point Avera*: The variable 
GPA is included as a continuous variable to determine the 
effects of one's GPA on eventual promotion in or separation 
from the Navy. The variable ranged from 1 with a GPA less 
than 2.0, to a 6 with a GPA greater than 3.6. 
&,.tbematics Oualification Coa: The variable MQC 
is included as a continuous variable to determine the 
effects of one's ~cademic record in mathematics-related 
courses on eventual promotion in or separation from the 
Navy. The variable ranged from a 1 with no math courses 
with a grade higbar than C to a 7 indicating significant 
post-calculus courses with a grade of B or better. 
Technical: The variable TQC 
is included as a continuous variable to determine the 
effects of one's academic record in physics based 
engineering courses on eventual promotion in or separation 
from the Navy. The variable ranged from a 1 with no physics 
courses to a 6 with upper division engineering/ physical 
science major with a B+ average or better. 
Graduate: k e variable GRRDED - 1 if the individual has a Masters degree, otherwise GRADED = 0. 
For those with a graduate degree, two additional 
variables are utilized: 
PGSCH - 1 if the individual received his/her degree from the 
Naval Postgraduate School, otherwise PGSCH - 0. 
= 1 if the individual received his/her graduate 
degree from an institution other than the Naval Postgraduate 
School, otherwise OTHERED = 0. 
01 Maiox: Two variables are defined 
in this category: 
GTECH - 1 if the individual has a Master's Degree in 
engineering, mathematics, computer science, operations 
analysis or natural/biological sciences, otherwise GTECH - 
0. 
GNONTECH - 1 if th3 individual has a Master's Degree in 
social sciences, arts, humanities, management, economics, 
education, etc., otherwise GNONTECH = 0. 
of U n d e r a r a w  and m u a t e  Schopl 
m: Four variables are used in this category to capture 
the combined affects of undergraduate major and graduate 
- major: 
NTUCNTG = 1 if the individual has both non-technical 
undergraduate and graduate degrees, otherwise NTUGNTG = 0. 
NTUGTG = 1 if the individual has a non-technical 
undergraduate degree and a technical graduate degree, 
otherwise NTUGTG = 0. 
TUGNTG = 1 if the individual has a technical undergraduate 
degree and a non-technical graduate degree, otherwise TUGNTG 
= 0. 
TUGTG = 1 if the individual has both technical undergraduate 
and graduate degrees, otherwise TUGTG - 0. 
The basic models estimated in this study are as 
LCDR STAYEBB - Pooled Sampl* 
PROMOTE = f (MALE + USNA + ROTCS + OSOURCE + BLACK + OTHER 
+ DIVONE + MARDEPS + AGE + PGSCH + OTHERED + CPA 
+ TECH) 
LCDR STAYERB - WOmm Only Bmple 
PROMOTE = f (USNA + ROTCS + OSOURCE + BLACK + OTHER + DIVONE 
+ MARDEPS + AGE + FGSCH + OTHERED + GPA + TECH) 
LCDR LEAVERRB - Pooled Smple 
LEAVE = f ( W E  + USNA + ROTCS + OSOVRCE + BLACK + OTHER 
+ DIVONE + ~ E P s  + AGE + PGSCH + OTHERED + GPA 
+ TECH) 
LCDR LEAVERS - W0E.n Only Smpl. 
LEAVE = f (USNA + ROTCS + OSOURCE + BLACK + OTHER + DIVONE 
+ MARDEPS + AGE + PGSCH + OTHERED + GPA + TECH) 
CDR BTAYERS - Pooled Smple* 
PROMOTE f (%E + ROTCS + OTHER + DIVONE + MARDEPS + AGE 
+ PGSCH + OTHERED + GPA + TECH) 
CDR BTAYERS - Women Only BanplO* 
PROMOTE = f (ROTCS + OTHER + DIVONE + MARDEPS + AGE + PGSCH 
+ OTHERED + GPA 4. TECH) 
CDR LEAVERB - Pooled Sample* 
LEAVE = f (MALE + ROTCS + OTHER + DIVONE + MAR3EPS + AGE 
+ PGSCH + OTHERED + GPA + TECH) 
CDR LEAVIZIW - woman only eample* 
LEAVE = f (ROTCS + OTHER + DIVONE + UARDEPS + AGE + PGSCH 
+ OTHERED + GPA + TECH) 
Aaditional models, referred to as wModsl 2",  are also 
estimated for these sampl&. Results are presented in 
Appendix B. 
Variables that were deleted from these models were due to 
small numbers of observations in thu files. 
Haximum likelihood (logit) regression models are 
 estimate^ using the dependent variables aPROMOTE" for the 
promotion model and "LEAVE" for the retention model. Each 
model is estimated for a pooled sample of LCDRs or CDRs for 
both men and women, and a separate model for females alone. 
Two samples are utilized to attempt to capture the effects 
of including males in the Gen URL community. Appendix B 
presents the complate results of estimating the models. 
Likelihood ratio tests are conducted to determine if the 
basic models are affected by the addition of specified 
explanatory variables. Appendix C explains how these tests 
are conducted along with the test results. 
The coefficients of the independent variables in the 
estimated logit equations are transformed into probabilities 
by setting the explanatory (dummy) variables equal to zero 
and solving for the predicted probability. In this manner, 
the probability of being promoted or leaving is established 
for a reference individual (base *-:se). In both models, the 
reference individual is a white female with no dependents 
who is commissioned through Officer Candidate School at age 
24, has a non-technical undergraduate degree, and does not 
have a graduate degree. By changing the va:ue of any single 
explanatory (dummy) varianle from zero to one, computing the 
new probability of being promoted or leaving, and then 
taking the difference between the two probabilities, a 
*deltaw for each variable is obtained. This delta 
represents the change in the probability of being promoted 
or leaving the Navy when one of the explanatory variables is 
altered from the base case while leaving all other variables 
unchanged. 
This section will present general results of both the 
LCDR promotion and retention models, followed by a 
discussion of the CDR models. 
A. PROIIOTIOB TO LCDR 
1. Education 
In the pooled sample of the basic promotion model 
for LCDRs, Naval Postqraduate School (NPS) graduate 
education has a significantly positive impact on the 
probability of promotion, (i.e., an officer with a graduate 
degree from NPS is 292 more likely to be promoted than an 
I 
officer with no graduate degree). Although not 
statistically significant, an officer with a graduate degree 
from other sources is also 152 more likely to be promoted 
than an officer with no degree. These effects on promotion 
are increased to 312 and 182, respectively, in tho women- 
only sample. These results are presented in Table 13. 
When variables for type of graduate degree (GTECW) 
and Technical Qualification Code (TQC) are included in the 
model, (Model 2), the impact of graduate education in both 
samples, while still positive, is no longer significant. 
Complete results of this model are presented in Append-x B. 
The variable &PA is not statistically significant, 
but does have a consistently positive coefficient in both 
models and samples. Likewise, the TECH variable is 
consistently negative, albeit statistically insignificant. 
TABLE 13 
CSUOE XU PROMOTLOU PROBABILITY FOR EDUCATIOM V?AIABLEB 
Source: See Tables B . 1 . A .  - B . Z . B .  in Appendix B  for 
complete listing of logit coefficients and transformed 
"deltas". 
= .05 level of confidence 
** = . O 1  level of confidence 
2. Commis~ioning Bourco 
Commissioning source variables are also included in 
the promotion models for LCDR. These variables show 
inconsistent and insignificant impacts on the probability of 
promotion, however, the results are worthy of discussion. 
In the pooled sample, all three commissioning source 
variables, USNA, ROTCS, and OSOURCE, have negative effects 
on the probability of promotion to LCDR. In essence, 
officers from these commissioning sources are less likely to 
b% promoted to LCDR than an OCS graduate. However, these 
variables are not statistically significant in any model. 
The specific statistics on these variables are presented in 
Table 14. 
Results of the women-only sample yield slightly 
different results. In this model, both USNA and OSOURCE 
still have negative effects on the probability of promotion. 
The ROTCS variable, however, is positive. Again, these 
variables lack statistical significance. 
TABLE 1 4  
CBAUQE I N  PROMOTION PROBABILITY BY COIQIIBBIONINO BOWCE 
Source: See Tables B.1.A. - B.2.B. in Appendix B for 
complete listing of logit coefficients and transformed 
ndeltasN. 
+ = .05 level of confidence 
+* = .O1 level of confidence 
3. Other Faatora 
The promotion model for LCDRs also controls for 
various demographic characteristics, such as race, 
marital/dependent status, age, etc. Again, none of these 
variables are statistically significant, however they 
represent possible trends that are worthy of discussion. 
The marital/deper.aent status variables DIVONE and 
PlARDEPS have a consistently negative impact on the 
probability of promotion to LCDR, however the degree of 
impact varies greatly between the pooled and women-only 
samples. In the pooled sample, officers divorced/separated 
with dependents are 2.92 less likely to be promoted than 
single officers without dependents, while the married 
officer with dependents is 11.42 less likely to be promoted. 
In the women-only sample, however, divorced/separated 
officers are 11.72 less likely to promote and those married 
with dependents are only 4.32 less likely to promote. These 
results are depicted in Table 15, but are difficult to 
interpret based on lack of statistical significance. 
The race variables have a very small impact on the 
probability of promotion to LCDR. Howevsr, it is 
interesting to note that the variable BLACK is consistently 
negative, while the OTHER variable is positive in the pooled 
sample and negative in the women-only sample. These 
results are also depicted in Table 15. 
TABLE IS 
-6s Ill P R O X O T I ~  PROBABILITY BY OTHER tMXOR8 
Source: See Tables B.1.A. - B.2.B. in Appendix B for 
complete listing of losit coefficients and transformed 
"deltas8*. 
- .05 level of confidence 
** = .O1 level of confidence 
Additional educational variables, such as Math 
Qualification Code and a combined variable to account for 
type of undergraduate major and graduate major together were 
included in the models. However, they did not significantly 
affect the probability of promotion; therefore, they were 
not included in the final model being estimated. 
8 .  RETENTIOM TO LCDII BELECTION BOARD 
1. Education 
In the basic pooled retention model for LCDRs, NPS 
graduate education has a statisrically significant negative 
impact on the probability of leaving the Navy ( e . ,  an 
officer with an NPS degree is 37% less likely to leave the 
Navy than an officer with no degree). In addition, an 
officer with a graduate degree from other sources is also 
225 less likely to leave the Navy than an officer with no 
degree. When the variables GTECH and TQC are added to the 
model, the effects of the PGSCH and O!WERED variables 
increase to 392 and 27*, respectively, and remain 
statistically significant. Similar results occurred in the 
women-only sample, with both PGSCH and OTh5RED variables 
exhibiting significant negative effects on the probability 
of leaving the Navy. These probability figures are 
presented in Table 16. 
TABLE 16 
QPUPOZ IN RETENTION PROBABILITY ?OR BDUCATXON VARIABLES 
VARIABLE POOLED 1 IOXEli-ONLY I I BASIC MODEL 2 BASIC HODEL 2 I 
Source: See Tables B.3.A. - B . 4 . B .  in Appendix B for 
complete listing of logit coefficients and transformed 
"deltas". 
= .05 level of confidence 
** - .O1 level of confidence 
2. Commissioning Source 
Commissioning source variables are also included in 
the LCDR retention models. These variables exhibit 
insignificant effects on the probability of leaving the 
Navy, however the trends are interesting to note here. 
In the pooled sample, all three commissioning source 
variables, USNA, ROTCS, and OSOURCE, have positive 
coefficients. However, when additional educational control 
variables are added to the model, (e.g., GTECH and TQC) the 
coefficients for USNA and ROTCS remain positive while the 
OSOURCE variable becomes negative. 
In the women-only sample, both USNA and ROTCS have 
positive coefficients, but the OSOURCE variable is negative. 
These results remain consistent when additional educational 
control variables are added to the model. The commissioning 
source probability results are provided in Table 17. 
,. 
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TABLE 17 
CEANGE I N  RETENTION PROBABILZTY BY CObQ4188IONING SOURCE 
Source: See Tables B.3.A. - B.4.B. in Appendix B for 
complete listing of logit coefficients and transformed 
ndeltasn. 
.05 level of confidence 
++ = .O1 level of confidence 
3. Othar Pactors 
The retention models also control for various 
demographic characteristics, such as maritalfdependent 
status, race, age, etc. Although the majority of these 
variables have insignificant effects on the probability of 
leaving the Navy, the HARDEPS variable is consistently 
significant in all cases. 
In both the pooled and women-only samples, the 
variable indicates that officers married with dependents are 
282 and 252, respectively, less likely to leave the Navy 
than an officer with no dependents. When additional 
educational control variables are added to the models, these 
percent7ges show an increaszd effect to 332 and 292, 
respectively. The other maritalfdependent status variable, 
DIVONE, although not statistically significant, is 
57 
consistently negative in all models. These results are 
included in Table 18. 
The race variables have an insignificant effect on 
the probability of leaving the Navy, with consistently 
negative coefficients in both samples. 
T m E  18 
QRlsaE Ill RETEMTIOU PROBABILITY BY OTBEIL PACTORB 
Source: See Tables B.?.A. - 8.4.8. in Appendix B for 
complete listing of lcjit coefficients and transformed 
ndeltasm. 
= .05 level c; confidence 
** = .O1 level of confidence 
As with the promotion models, additional educational 
variables were included in the retention models. However, 
these variables did not significantly affect the probability 
of leaving the Navy; therefore they were not incluaed in the 
final models being estimated. 
C. PR0110TION TO CD4 
Similar promotion models were run for both CDR samples. 
Unfortunately, these models do not provide conclusive 
results for the probability of promotion to CDR. General 
results concerning the graduate education variables are 
provided below. 
In the promotion models for CDRs, both samples, those 
with a degree from NPS are approximately 142 more likely to 
be promoted than those without a degree. Likewise, a 
graduate degree from other sources increases the probability 
of promotion by approximately 9.5%. However, none of the 
variables have a statistically significant effect on the 
probability of promotion to CDR in either the pooled or 
women-only samples. Results of these estimations appear in 
Tables B.S.A. and B.5.B. of Appendix B. 
Additional educational variables were added to the 
models to try to improve the explanatory power of the 
estimates. However, based upon likelihood ratio testa, 
these variables did not significantly contribute to the 
basic model. 
D. RETENTION TO CDR SELECTION BOARD 
The results from the CDR retention models are unreliable 
due to a lack of sufficient variation in LEAVE versus STAY 
behavior i . ,  only 47 of 790, 62, actually left the Navy 
voluntarily). Results of the estimations are included in 
Tables B . 6 . A .  and 8 . 6 . 8  of Appendix B . ,  but will not h 
discussed here. 
V. CONCLUBIONS AND RECOMMENDATION8 
A COIOCLUSIONS 
1 Qr8du8to Eduo8tion 
It is apparent from the results of the estimations 
that graduate education has a positive and significant 
effect on the probability of being promoted to Lieutenant 
Commander (LCDR) in the General Unrestricted Line (Gen URL) 
community. Further, a degree from the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) appears to have a much stronger influence on 
promotion than a graduate degree from other sources. This 
would appear to indicate that a degree from the Naval 
Postgraduate School is more credible in the eyes of 
selection boarda than a graduate degree from civilian 
institutions, regardless of how funded. Of course, these 
results are limited only to Gen .'3L officers and may not be 
consistent for other communities. 
Although it is not statistically significant in 
every model, the OTHERED variable still shows that obtaining 
a graduate degree, regardless of source, has a positive 
effect on promotion. These results are not surprising, 
because of the reqrtirerrent for Gen URLs t~ work toward 
proven subspecialist designations in order to be successful. 
As long as one obtains the appropriate subspecialty code for 
the graduate degree, one is not prohibited from acquiring 
the proven subspecialist designation and, therefore, not 
excluded from promotion opportunities based upon degree 
source. 
It is somewhat surprising to note that the effects 
of graesate education are not significantly higher for the 
women-only sample than for the pooled eample. It was 
anticipated that, because males are less competitive in the 
Gen URL community overall, the attainment of a graduate 
degree would not significantly increase his chances of 
promotion. This may be due to the fact that we are dealing 
with junior paygrades and the stiff competition may not be 
revealed untll the higher paygrade selection boards. 
The other ~ducational control variables that were 
included provided no statistically significant effects. 
However, grade point average is consistently positive, 
indicating that those with higher undergraduate grades may 
be more likely to be promoted to LCDR. Likewise, those with 
a technical undergraduate major may be less likely to be 
promoted than those with a non-technical major. This is 
somewhat surprising when considering that nearly 402 of the 
observations have technical undergraduate majors. However, 
this effect could be due to the generally non-technical 
requirements for promotion in the Gen URL community. 
Emphasis has historically been on performance in leadership 
tours. Specific technical expertise is not a prerequisite 
62 
to obtaining most Gen URL leadership billets at the LCDR and 
below level. In the recent past, more emphasis has been 
placed on attaining technical skills; however, this is 
primarily focused on graduate degree major selection and 
proven subspecialty designation, not on leadership, per se. 
In the retention model for LCDRs, graduate 
education, again, has a statistically significant effect. 
In all samples, both an NPS degree and a degree frdm other 
I 
sources significantly decreases the probability of lleaving 
the Navy. The effect of NPS is not surprising because af 
the additional service obligation incurred. The reasons for 
the strength of the OTHERED variable is not as clear. Some 
of the individuals in this category may have received Navy 
funding for their education and therefore, have incurred the 
same "payback" commitment as NPS graduates. This would 
account for some of the strong negative effects shown here. 
However, a n~mber of these individuals probably attained 
their graduate degree at their own expense and incu~red no 
additional obligation to the Navy. The impact of this group 
on the strength and direction of the OTHERED coefficient is 
unknown. 
As occur in the promotion models, the educational 
control variables are not statistically significant, but are 
consistent in their effects on the protability of leaving. 
Grade point average is positive, indicating that individuals 
With higher undergraduate grades are more likely to leave 
the Navy. And TECH is negative, indicating that those with 
a technical undergraduate degree are less likely to leave 
the Navy. While these results are consistent throughout a11 
LCDR retention models, they are inconsistent with the 
effects shown in the promotion models. The reasons for this 
disparity are unclear. 
The results of the estimations for the Commander 
promotion model were disappointingly insignificant. In the 
graduate education variables, over 502 of the samples have 
graduate degrees, most of which were received through 
sources other than NPS. Although the variables indicate 
that individuals with graduate education are more likely to 
promote to CDR than 'those without, the effacts are not 
statistically significant. 
This may have occurred due to the lack of variation 
in the characteristics of individuals included in the 
sample. As discussed in the introduction, the vast majority 
of these individuals fit into a very similar pattern (i.e., 
white, female, single, no dependents, OCS graduates, with 
non-technical educations). There are simply not enough 
differences between them to adequately model. The results 
could also indicate that promotion to CDR is based upon 
factors that are not specifically included here, such as 
fitness reports and/or some other measure of performance in 
critical leadership billets. 
2. commissioning Source 
The commissioning source variables had unexpected 
effects on the probability of promotion to LCDR in the 
pooled sample. Even though not statistically significant, 
it was not expected that the commissioning source variables 
would have negative Coefficients. This may be due to the 
fact that nearly half of the Gen URLs commissioned through 
the non-OCS sources are males. As will be disoussed later, 
gender appears to have a negative effect on the probability 
of promotion, and these effects may somehow be extended 
through the commissioning source variables as well. 
In the LCDR retention models, commissioning source 
variables showed positive, but insignificant effects on the 
probability of leaving the Navy in the pooled sample. 
However, in the women-only samples, the OSOiTRCE variable vas 
consistently negative. This is probably due to the fact 
that most officers commissioned through these sources have 
prior enlisted service and are more career-oriented because 
of their time-in-service. 
3. Other Variables 
The effects of gender on the probability of 
promotion to LCDR are not surprising. Males are 392 less 
likely to be promoted to LCDR. This is most likely a 
consequence of the small number of males in the community 
(202).  as well as their reasons for entering the community 
in the first place (e.g., family hardships). As the Gen URL 
community exercises its new selectivity options to admit 
other designators into the community, this trend may change. 
The demographic control variables ( 8 .  race and 
marital/d.pendent status) showed insignificant effects on 
the probability of promotion to LCDR. This may be due to 
the small number of observations in these categories when 
compared to the base case, (i.e., roughly 80% of the samples 
are single with no dependents, and 88% are white). 
In the LCDR retention models, the demographic 
control variables for maritalldependent status were much 
stronger than anticipated. The variable MARDEPS was 
statistically significant in all models, indicating that 
individuals with families are less likely to leave the Navy, 
at least at this point in their career. This may simply be 
due to the fact that the Navy provides a family with a 
steady income and numerous benefits, which may not be easily 
duplicated in the cjvilian sector. If the variable 
continues to be significant at higher paygrades, then 
additional interpretations may be necessary. Although the 
DIVONE variable did have a negative coefficient, it is 
unclear why those divorced/separated with dependents were 
not significantly less likely to leave the Navy. These 
individuals may also have familial obligations that the 
Navy's benefits would ease. Additional research on the 
characteristics of these individuals would be needed to 
adequately answer these questions. 
Based upon the results of these thesis, the following 
actions are recommended: 
1. Publicize the results of this thesis to Gen URL 
community managers and manpower policy-makers. The 
information concerning the effects of graduate 
education and degree source may influence Gen URL 
officer selection to Naval Postgraduate School billets 
in the future. As a minimum, it will provide support 
to the request for additional billets at NPS for the 
Gen URL officer community. 
2. Review the results concerning commissioning source 
variables on tha probability of promotion and retention 
in the Navy. At the time of this study less than 1 5 1  
of the Gen URL officers were commissioned through USNA 
and ROTCS and those that did were less likely to be 
promoted and more likely to leave the Navy. Either 
this indicates that quality officers commissioned 
through these sources are not selecting the Gen URL 
community, or that the officers from these sources are 
simply not competitive with OCS graduates in this 
community. In either case, the Gen URL community 
should review this issue to determine if this indicates 
a selection criterion problem or a community reputation 
problem at these commissioning source institutions. 
3. Publicize the results of this thesis to the Naval 
Postgraduate School admissions and manpower officials 
to ensure they are aware of the strong impact the 
institution has on the careers of Gen URL officers. 
Before a final determination can be made concerning the 
value 02 graduate education to the Gen Ur.L officer, 
additional research is recommended in several areas. 
First, an analysis of Navy-funded graduate education 
versus self-funded graduate education would better determine 
the effect of graduate education on the probability of 
promotion. Although the OTHERED variabla in this study 
provas some information about this effect, it doas not 
differentiate between education that incurs and obligation 
and education obtained at the officer's expense. An attempt 
was made to identify these categories in this study using 
education Sponsor Codes. However, the data file had too 
many missing values to be reliable. 
Second, one might model promotion probability at the 
senior paygrades, (i.e., CDR and CAPl') for those Gsn URL 
officers with proven subspecialist designations to determine 
the effect of this designation on promotion. As promotion 
opportunities diminish and competition increases, it would 
be interesting to see if the "technical expertisem gained 
through this designation significantly enhances one's rob 
ability of promotion. 
One might also choose to replicate this study on Gen VRC 
officers in LCDR and CDR paygrades five years from now. 
With the changing demographics in society, the officers 
appearing before the selection boards in the future may 
exhibit more diversity in background and expertise. This 
may provide more informative results concerning the value of 
graduate education to the Gen URL officer. 
i 
i 
Finally, other Unrestricted Line communities have 1 
similar requirements to achieve the proven subspecialist i 
. desiqs-+ion at some point in their careers. These 
communities are vastly larger than the Gen URL community and 
include more diversity in characteristics. Because they I I 
have stringent nwarfaren qualifications to obtain throughout 
- their careers, graduate education may be viewed as an 
ninter~ptionw in their career path. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to determine the effects of graduate education 
on their promotion probabilities. 
LIST OF PWEBQICEB 
1. U.S. Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, 
*Graduate Education," OPNAV Instruction 1520.23A, 14 March 
1986, pps. A-1 - A-2. 
2. U.S. Department of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy, 
"Policies on Graduate Education for Military Officers,* 
SECNAV Instruction 1524.2A1 27 March 1989, p. 1. 
3. U.S. Department f the Navy, Chief of Naval operations, 
*Fully Funded Gradua e Education Programs, FY-92", OPNAV 
Notice 1520, 25 Apri f 1991. 
4. U.S. Department of the Navy, "Manual of Navy Officer 
Manpower and Personnel Clas~ification,~ NAVPERS 15839G, 2 
March 1990, Volume I, pps. I-B-1 to I-B-10 and Volume 11, 
pps. 11-D-1 to 11-D-6. 
5. U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Officer Career 
Planning Guidebook, 'NAVPERS 15605, PY90 edition, p. 12. 
6. U.S. Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, 
*Navy Study Group's Report on Progress of Women in the 
Navy," 5 December 1987, pps. ES-11 - 2-35. 
7. Backer, Gary Human New York: National Dlreau 
of Economic Research, 1975. 
8. U.S. Department of Defense, *Policy on Graduate 
Education for Military  officer^,^ DOD Directive 1322.10, 31 
August 1990, p. G-1. 
9. Lockman, Robert F., Cymrot, Donald J., Richardson, 
Michael A., and Murray, Martha S., "Officer Graduate 
Education in the Navy," Center for Naval Analyses, 
Alexandria, VA, April 1986. 
10. Cprot, Donald J., "Graduate Education and the 
Promoti.3~ uf Officers," Center for Naval Analyses, 
Alexandr, VA, March 1986. 
11. Lurie. Philip M., 'Relating Personnel to the Material 
Conf3ition or' Surface Combatants," Center for Naval Analyses, 
Alexamkia, VA, January 1986. 
12. Stainer, Kenneth W., - e Eduation: DQ 
h e  N a w  and URL Officer -Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1986. 
13. Lowell, Richard W., A n v s i s  of the F w  
tina the Career Oripntation/Turnover Behavior of Fern& 
Naval, Master's Thesis. Naval Postqraduate Sch-.I.. 
Honterey, CA, December 1987. 
- 
14. Congressional Budget Office, *Officer Commissi.-ninq 
Programs: Costs and Officer Performance," Washington, D.C., 
June 1990. 
16. Pindyck, Robert and Rubinfeld, Daniel, EEpnomet ' 
Nodels and Economic Forecasts, 2nd ed., (San Francis2 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981) pps. 270-280. 
17. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel 
Command, "Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active 
Duty, DD Form 214*,'NUPC Instruction 1900.1B, 11 September 
1986. 
18. Judge, George G., Hill, R. Carter, Griffiths, William 
E., Lutkepohl, Helmut, and Lee, Tsoung-Chao, 
eorv and Practlce of Econometri~g, 2nd ed., John Wiley 
h Sons, Inc., 1988, pps. 99-104. 
Backer, Gary , HumanCaaftal, New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1975. 
Bowman, William R., "Are Service Academies Worth the Cost? 
Recent Findings for Navy Warfare Officersu, paper prepared 
for the Ivs Biennial Conference, Baltimore, MD, 11-13 
October 1991. 
Congressional Budget Office, "Officer Commissioning 
Programs: Costs and Officer PerformanceIu Washington, DC, 
June 1990. 
Cymrot, Donald J. "Graduate Education and the Promotion of 
Officers," Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, March 
1986. 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. and Smith, Robert S., nodern Labor 
conolaica:, 3rd ed., Scott, 
Foresman, and Company, 1988. 
Foster, Michael 3.. the Belative Pro- 
gf Officers from Diffeent Accession Sources, Master's 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 1990. 
Judge, George G., Hill, R. Carter, Griffiths, William E., 
Lutkepohl, Helmut, and Lae, Tsoung-Chao, --to 
m e o m  and r-, 2nd ed., John Wiley & 
sons, Inc., 1988. 
Lockman, Robert F., Cymrot, Donald J., Richardson, Michael 
A., and Murray, Martha S., "Officer Gradute Education in the 
Navy," Canter for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, April 
1986. 
Lowell, Richard W., W v s i s  of the Factors Af- 
Career Orientation/Turnover Behaivor of Female Naval 
m, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
nonterey, CA, December 1987. 
Lurie, Phili? M., "Relating Personnel to the Material 
Condition of Surface Combatants," Center for Naval Analyser, 
Alexandria, VA, January 1986. 
Pindyck, Robert and Rubinfeld, Daniel, Econome- 
omlc Forecas-, 2nd ed., (San Francisco, CA: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981). 
Steiner, Kenneth W., -&on: - Do t;ha 
, Master's Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CAI 1986. 
U.S. Department of Defense, *Policy on Graduate Education 
for Military Officers," DOD Directive 1322.10, 31 August 
1990. 
U.S. Department of the Navy. Chief of Naval Operations, 
"Graduate Education," OPNAV Instr~ction 1520.23A, 14 March 
1986. 
U.S. Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, 
*Fully Funded Graduate Education Programs, (FY-92)", 
OPNAV Notice 1520, 25 April 1991. 
U.S. Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Navy 
Study Group's Report on Progress of Women in the Navy, 5 
December 1987. 
U.S. Department of the Navy, "Manual of Navy Officer 
Manpower and Personnel Classification", NAVPERS 15839G, 
Volume I and Volume 11, 2 March 1990. 
U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel 
Command, " Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active 
Duty, DD Form 214", NMPC instruction 1900.1B, 11 September 
1986. 
U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Oficer Career Planning 
Guidebook, NAVPERS 15605, FY90 edition. 
U.S. Department of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy, 
"Policies on Graduate Education for Military  officer^,^' 
SECNAV Instruction 1524.2A. 27 March 1989. 
A P P r n I .  A 
COMSTRUCTIOls O? PILES 
dl files are constructed using data from 0 f f icer 
Promotion History Piles, Officer Master Record Files, an5 
Officer Waster Loss Piles. Officers who left the Navy for 
medical/disability reasons or death were deleted prior to 
construction of the files used in this study. 
1. LCDR "STAYEBS" FILE 
This file is constructed using the Officer Promotion 
History (OPH) file of all officars who appear before the 
Lieutenant selection boards in fiscal years 1981 through 
1987, the file of all officers who appear before the 
Lieutenant Commander selection board in fiscal years 1985 
through 1990, and the officers from the Officer Master bass 
file (OML) who leave the Navy during the years 1981 through 1 
1990. 
The file of Lieutenants (LT) is modified to include only 
officers with the designator 1100 or 1105. This file is 
merged with the Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) file by 
(scrambled) social security number to obtain a file of 
Genexal Unrestricted Line (Gen URL) officers who had 
remained in the Navy and the community *hrough selection to 
LCDR. This file also include officers who have entered the I 
Gen URL community at any time prior to the LCDR selection 
board. 
To identify the Gen URL officers who leave the Navy 
prior to LCDR, the LT file is merged with the OWL file of 
all officers who leave the Navy. From this file, separation 
program designator codes are obtained and decoded to 
determine those vho have left the Navy involuntarily. A 
1 parate file of these officers is then created. To create the final LCDR "STAYERS* file, the merged 
LT/LCDR Gen URL file is merged with the involuntary leavers 
file. This file consists of 1070 observations. After 
deleting observations with missing values, the final ..umber 
of observations in the pooled LCDR STAYERS file used to 
model promotion is 1040. 
Y. LCDR "LEAVERS" PILE 
This file is constructed using the OPH file of all 
officers appearing before the LT selection board in fiscal 
year 1981 through 1987, the file of all officers appearing 
before the LCDR selection board in fiscal year 1985 through 
1990, and the OML file of a11 officers leaving the Navy 
between the years 1981 and 1990. 
The file of LTs is modified to include only those 
officers with the designator 1100 or 1105. This file is 
then merged with the O X L  file to obtain a file of LT Gen mu, 
officers who leave the Nsvy. From this file, separation 
program designator codes are obtained and decoded to 
deternine those who leave the Navy voluntarily. 
To identify those officers who have left the Gen URL 
community prior to the LCDR selectio,~ board, the LT Gen URL 
file i s  merged with the LCDR file in which all E C l z  
1 1 0 0 / 1 1 0 5 ~ s  have been deleted. Once merged, the Prlor 
Designator variable is reviewed to identify those LCDRs who 
had previously been 1100/1105e. A new file of these 
observations is created. 
To obtain the final LCDR "LEAVERS" file, the voluntary 
leavers file is added to the prior Gen URL file. This file 
contains 1275 observations. To run the retention model, the 
pooled LCDR nLEAVERSM file is added to the pooled LCDR 
nSTAYERSn file and includes 2345 observations. 
3 CDB "STAYERS" ? f L l  
This file is constructed using the OPH file of only 
those Gen URL officers who appear before the LCDR selection 
board in fiscal year 1981 to 1987, the file of Gen URL 
officers appearing before the Commander (CDR) selection 
board in fiscal year 1986 to 1990, and those Gen URL 
officers from the OML file who leave the Navy during the 
years 1976 to 1987. 
The LCDR Gun URL file is merged with the CDR Gen URL 
file by (scrambled) social security number to obtain a file 
of Gen URL officers who remain in the Navy and the community 
through selection to Commander. This file also includes any 
officers who enter the Gen URL community prior to selection 
for CDR. 
To identify those Gen URL officers who leave the Navy 
prior to tho CDR selection bsrrd, the LCDR Gen URL file is 
merged with the OML file. From this file, separation 
program designator codes are o b ~ ~ i n e d  and decoded to 
identify those who leave the Navy involuntarily. These 
involuntary leavers are placed into a separate file. 
To construct the final CDR *STAYERSn file, the merged 
LCDR/CDR Gen URL file is merged with the involuntary leavers 
file. This file consists of 430 observations. After 
deleting those observations with missing values, the final 
pooled CDR "STAYERSV file used to model promotion consists 
of 404 observations. 
4. CDR "LEAVERB" FILE 
This file is created using the OPH file of all Gen URL 
officers appearing before the LCDR selecticn board from 
fiscal year 1981 to 1987, and the OML file of all Gen URL 
officers who leave the Navy during the years 1976 to 1987. 
The ICDR Gen URL file is merged with the Gen URL OML 
file to obtain a file of TCDR Gen URLs who leave the Navy. 
From this file, separation program designator codes are 
obtained and decoded to identify those who leave the Navy 
voluntarily. 
Those officers who lerve the Gen URL community prior to 
the CDR selection board are unidentifiable in these files. 
Therefore, the final CDR "LEAVERS" file is created using the 
merged LCDR Gen URL/Voluntary leavers files referred to 
above. This file consists of 386 observat;ons. To run the 
retention model, the pooled CDR *LEAVERSn file is added to 
the pooled CDR *STAYERSm file and includes 790 
observations. 
A P P E m I X  B 
MODEL RESULTS 
TABLE B.1-A LOOIT RIZSULTS FOR LCDR "BTAYERB" POOLED SAHPLE 
(BASIC MODEL) 
N - 1040 
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- significant at .O1 level 
** = significant at .05 level 
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(intercept) only. 
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N - 751 
chi-aquare values in parerL.hemem 
- significant at .O1 level 
** - siqnificant at .05 level 
+ Amrage age was included in the calculation for the base caaa 
(intercept) only. 
APPENDIX C 
LIl(dC1HOOD RATIO YEBT RESULTS 
LIXELIXOOD RATIO TEST RESULTS ?OR LCDR "STAYERS" 
POOLED YODEL 
RESTRICTED YODEL: PROMOTE = MALE + USNA + ROTCS + 
OSOURCE + BLACK + OTHER + DIVONE + KARDEPS + AGE + PGSCH 
+ OTHERED + GPA + TECH 
UXWZSTRICTED MODEL: PROMOTE = PULLE + USNA + ROTCS + 
OSOURCE + BLACK + OTHER + DIVONE + KARDEPS + AGE + PGSCH 






Critical Chi-square valses (df=2) 
9.21 at .Of level of significance . 
5.99 at .05 level of aignficance 
TABLE C.1 
LIIELIEWD FtATIO TEST RESULTS FOR LCDR "STAYERS88 
WOMEN-OMLY SAXPLE 




Critical Chi-square values (df-2) 
9.21 at -01 level of significance 
5.93 at .05 level of signficance 
TABLE C.3 
LIKELIHOOD BAT10 TEST RESULTS FOR LCDR "LWVZRSa' POOLED 
SAMPLE 
I RICSTRICTED YODEL: PROMOTE = MALE + USNA + ROTCS + OSOURCE + BLACK + OTHER + DIVONE + MARDEPS + AGE + PGSCH + OTHERED + GPA + TECH I UNRESTRICTED YODEL: PROMOTE = MALE + USNA + ROTCS + OSOURCE + BLACK + OTHER + DIVONE + HARDEPS + AGE + PGSCH + OTHERED + GPA + TECH + GTECH + TQC I Restricted Likelihood Function Unrestricted Computed Likelihood Chi-square Punction Value 
Critical Chi-square values (df=2) 
9.21 at .Ol level of significance 
5.99 at .Of level of signficance 
TABLE C.4 
LIItLUlWD RATIO TEST REBULTS FOR LCDR "LEAVERS" WO%EU-OMLY 
SAMPLE 
RESTRICTED HODEL: PROMOTE = USNA + ROTCS + OSOURCE + 
B U M  + OTHER + DIVONE + MARDEPS + AGE + PGSCH 
+ OTHERED + GPA + TECH 
UNRESTRICTED MODEL: PROMOTE - USNA + ROTCS + OSOURCE + 
BLACK + OTHER + DIVONE + MARDEPS + AGE + PGSCH + 
OTHERED + GPA + TECH + GTECH + TQC 
Ramtriotad 
Likelihood 




Critical Chi-square values (df=2) 
9.21 at .O1 level of significance 
5.99 at .05 level of signficance 
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